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I. DISCUSSION 
I. CLAIMANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR HEARING 
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Respondent argues " [t]his Court has previously defined a 
fair hearing in the context of the unemployment compensation 
program." Resp't's Br. at 9. In support of its argument, 
Respondent cites to Nelson v. Department of Employment Security, 
801 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah App. 1990), for the general rule that 
11
' [w] hile [this Court has] recognized the importance and 
necessity of preserving fundamental requirements in 
administrative hearings, administrative hearings need not possess 
the formality of judicial proceedings.'" Resp't's Br. at 9-10 
(quoting Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163) (bracket inserted). For 
additional support, Respondent again cites to Nelson to show this 
Court found Nelson received a fair hearing because even though 
she appeared pro se, she had ample opportunity to present her 
story and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 10 (citing 
Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163). Respondent further cites to Nelson to 
show this Court found a fair hearing resulted because, "'The ALJ, 
in fact, questioned the employer's witnesses in order to bring 
out Ms. Nelson's side of the story. Ms. Nelson expressed no 
confusion, nor did she request assistance at the hearing.'" Id. 
(quoting Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163). 
2 
The instant matter is distinguishable from Nelson. What is 
deemed a "fair hearing" in one hearing does not necessarily apply 
in the next instance, unless the facts and the procedures are 
similar. Here, the facts and procedures are dissimilar. This is 
because Nelson did not deal with the request for and the denial 
of the statutorily mandated issuance of subpoenas, when requested 
by a party, at the outset of the hearing process Accordingly, 
Nelson is dissimilar to the instant matter and, as such, does not 
support Respondent's argument. 
Respondent also argues that "administrative hearings need 
not possess the formality of judicial proceedings." Nelson, 801 
P.2d at 163. Claimant does not dispute this. However, Claimant 
does dispute what Respondent cites as the major theme of the 
passage it cites from Nelson, see Resp't's Rpy. at 9-10. 
Claimant is not asserting he was involved in a judicial 
proceeding. Such an assertion is immaterial to this matter. The 
relevant theme from Respondent's cited passage is "the importance 
and necessity of preserving [the] fundamental requirements of 
procedural fairness in administrative hearings[.]" Nelson, 801 
P.2d at 163 (bracket inserted). 
One such fundamental procedural requirement for the 
preservation of administrative hearings is the issuance of 
subpoenas when requested by a party. If fact, by statute, it is 
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a procedure which is required, not discretional. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46-7(2) (1987) ("S]ubpeonas and other orders to secure 
the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence in 
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the presiding 
officer when requested by any party[.]"). 
If the Legislature did not feel that in order to preserve 
the "procedural fairness" of administrative hearings by the 
mandatory issuance of subpoenas, then the Legislature would not 
have placed the mandatory requirement of the issuance of 
subpoenas, when requested by a party, upon the ALJ. The 
Legislature would have left it to his or her arbitrariness or 
discretion, or both. However, this is not the case. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature's mandatory 
requirement of the issuance of subpoenas when a party so requests 
was put in place to ensure that "procedural fairness" in 
administrative hearings will thereby be achieved, which, in turn, 
will maintain "the importance of procedural fairness in 
administrative hearings." E.g., Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163. 
Procedural fairness loses all significance when a party 
requests a subpoena be issued whereby his or her hearing will be 
fair, however, said request is denied. The ultimate arbitrary 
denial of such a request will inevitably always prejudice a 
party. 
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II. THE ALJ'S FAILURE TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS 
IN THIS CASE DID CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Claimant agrees with Respondent's analysis of Shively v. 
Stewart, 421 P.2d 65, 68 (CA. 1967). Respondent states "[a] 
California case involving a similar provision in the California 
Administrative Proceedings Act says that because of the phrase of 
law 'shall' issue, the issuance is a ministerial act, and the ALJ 
has no discretion." Resp.t's Rpy at 13. (citing Shively, 421 
P.2d at 68). 
That case involves the same process which applied to the 
Claimant. Here, Claimant sought the issuance of subpoenas, but 
was denied by the ALJ.1 Resp't's Reply at 12. In Shively, 
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 [sjection 11510 of the Government Code provide [d] that on proper 
application before the hearing subpoenas 'shall issue,' and 
whether the subpoenas are sought for the production of evidence 
of to secure prehearing discovery, their issuance is a 
ministerial act to which the agency or the hearing officer has no 
discretion." 421 P.2d at 68 (brackets inserted). This is the 
same argument Claimant advanced. 
Claimant argued that the use of the word "shall" placed a 
substantive limitation on an ALJ's discretion with respect to the 
xBoth parties agree there was a request made by the Claimant 
for the issuance of subpoenas, but his request was declined by 
the ALJ. 
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issuance of subpoenas. Claimant's Opening Br. at 12. And, based 
on this, Claimant's due process rights were violated and, 
therefore, this matter should be remanded back to the agency. 
Id. Claimant further argued he had been denied due process when 
there has been an abuse of discretion in the manner the ALJ 
conducts his proceeding. See id. 
K-Mart Corp. v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 679 P.2d 559 
(Ariz. App. 1984)2 also supports Claimant's argument. In K-
Mart, the Court stated that "this rule permits the administrative 
law judge to deny a subpoena request 'only when the requested 
statement if not forthcoming or where it is clearly shown in the 
statement itself that the solicited testimony would not be 
material and necessary." Id. at 561 (citing Reinprecht v. 
Industrial Commission, 550 P.2d 654, 657 (1976)). The Court thus 
concluded that if Reinprecht is applied literally, the 
administrative law judge was absolutely required to issue the 
subpoenas." Id. Similarly, a literal reading of § 63-46-7(2) 
leads to the same conclusion, "the administrative law judge was 
absolutely required to issue the subpoenas." K-Mart Corp., 679 
P.2d at 657. 
Claimant asserts that if an ALJ is left with an arbitrary 
choice to issue or not issue subpoenas, then his or her decision 
2Cited and addressed in Resp't's Br. at 13. 
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will have a prejudicial impact on a hearing's outcome. This is 
because an ALJ is left with an arbitrary decision of which 
witness(es) any given party should or should not call in order to 
assist in the determination of the cause at hand. However, an 
ALJ's role in these administrative hearings is to determine 
whether or not there was just cause for the termination of an 
individual, not which witness(es) may or not assist in that 
determination. Each party knows who will or will not assist in 
that process and, in fact, these decisions are left for each 
party to decide, not an ALJ. 
An ALJ should proceed with and always maintain a neutral 
role in these matters. Put another way, he or she must remain 
objective. However, when he or she refuses to issue subpoenas at 
the outset of any hearing, then the scales of justice are tilted 
toward a subjective belief and as a result, prejudices occurs 
because it appears as though an ALJ has already decided what he 
or she must wait to decide. 
Finally, the K-Mart Corp Court also concluded that the 
administrative judge found that the administrative law judge 
abused his discretion. A similar finding should be found in the 
instant matter. 
Respondent's final argument is that "an appellate court may 
grant relief only 'if it determines that a person seeking 
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judicial review has been substantially prejudiced." Resp't's Br. 
at 15 (quoting Cache County v. Tax Commission, 296 Adv. Rep. 33, 
39 (Utah 1996) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-16(4))). "'In 
other words, we must be able to demonstrate that the alleged 
error was not harmless. Thus, the aggrieved party must be able 
to demonstrate how the agency's action has prejudiced it.'" 
Cache County, 296 Adv. Rep. at 39 (citations omitted). 
"Substantially prejudiced" quoted in Cache County relied 
upon the language stated in § 63-46-16(4). Respondent misreads 
Cache County and what is meant in § 63-46-16(4). Section 63-46-
16(4), in pertinent part reads: "The appellate court shall grant 
relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been 
substantially prejudiced by any one of the following." Id. 
These include, but are not limited to: "(d) the agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law; (e) the agency has 
engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure[.] Id. 
With respect to subsection (d), this is what Claimant is 
asserting, i.e., the ALJ erred in his interpretation and 
application of § 63-46-7(2) when he denied Claimant's request for 
the issuance of subpoenas. 
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Regarding subsection (e), similarly, Claimant asserted both, 
the ALJ engaged in an unlawful procedures and he failed to follow 
prescribed procedure when he denied Claimant's request for 
subpoenas. By failing to issue subpoenas, Claimant "was [denied] 
his fundamental right to present witnesses and, [accordingly the 
ALJ] frustrated the achievement of substantial justice." K-Mart 
Corp, 679 P.2d at 562 (citation omitted). 
III. CLAIMANT'S RIGHT TO SUBPOENA WITNESSES 
Respondent argues that " [i]t appears the claimant contents 
the word 'Shall' as used in § 63-46b-7(2) creates a liberty 
interest in the right to have subpoenas issued in administrative 
hearings." Resp't's Br. at 17. Respondent also argues that 
"claimant clearly has a due process right to present witnesses on 
his behalf, and have those witnesses subpoenaed if necessary." 
Id. at 18. Claimant agrees with Respondent's first statement, 
however, disagrees with its second. Section § 63-46b-7(2) does 
not support Respondent's second statement. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46-7(2) ("S]ubpeonas and other orders to secure the attendance 
of witnesses or the production of evidence in formal adjudicative 
proceedings shall be issued by the presiding officer when 
requested by any party[.]"). There is no reference to "if 
necessary" in this section. The issuance is mandatory, not 
arbitrary. 
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Respondent also argues that " [i]t appears that claimant 
contends the word 'shall' as used in UCA § 63-46b-7(2) creates a 
liberty interest in the right to have subpoenas issued in 
administrative proceedings." Resp't's Br. at 17. In addition, 
it adds, "Counsel for Respondents could find no case law directly 
on point for this question." Id. Respondent then offers this 
Court's definition of liberty interest." Id. at 17-18. Claimant 
does not dispute that definition, but would like to supplement 
that definition. 
"It is apparent from our decision that there exists a 
variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are 
nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either "liberty 
or property" as meant by the Due Process Clause." Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976). And, " [t]hese interests attain this 
constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been 
initially recognized and protected by state law [footnote 
omitted], and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State 
seeks to remove or alter that protected status." Id. at 710-11. 
In the instant matter, Claimant's interest in having 
subpoenas issued attained Constitutional status because his right 
to have subpoenas was initially recognized and protected by State 
law, that is, § 63-46b-7(2). 
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Respondent further argues that § 63-46-7(2) must read at the 
backdrop of § 63-46b-8(l)(a), "'which provides that the 
[p]residing officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to 
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the 
parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions." 
Resp't's Br. at 18 (quoting § 63-46b-8(1)(a)). The two sections 
cited for the Respondent are different statutes. One applies to 
what is procedurally correct before a hearing has started. See § 
63-46-7(2). The second applies to what is expected of an ALJ 
once the hearing is underway through the end of the hearing. See 
§ 63-46b-8(l)(a), Respondent has placed the two statutes in the 
wrong order. The numerical order they were placed in Utah Code 
Ann, is a good starting point, that is, which statute should be 
applied first. 
Respondent finally argues that "[i]t is difficult to see how 
the claimant was denied a right to have witnesses subpoenaed when 
he did not challenge the denial of subpoenas on the record, did 
not ask for subpoenas during the hearing, and waived his right by 
not objecting the denial of the subpoenas." Resp't's Br. at 19. 
Respondent is attempting to place the burden on the 
Claimant. Section § 63-46-7(2) places the burden on the ALJ. 
Claimant asked for and was told, no. Resp't's Br. at 12. It is 
no different in a civil matter wherein a discovery request is 
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made, and a judge says well, that's okay, you do not need it and 
then you proceed with the hearing. On appeal, one of your appeal 
issues would be the denial of your discovery request. Respondent 
admits that such a request was made and that there was a denial 
of this request. Resp't's Br. at 12. How often does the request 
need to be made, and then be told no. "'In cases where the basic 
question is what does the law require? the standard is a 
correction of error standard.'" Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Savage 
Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 668 
(Utah 1991)). 
IV. WHETHER THE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
OR ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
Claimant stands on the strength of this Opening Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should remand this 
matter back to the agency whereby Claimant can receive a fair and 
impartial hearing. 
DATED this j W _ day of November, 1996. 
"Da^ rar" L ". -Grtnast a f f 
Attorney for Claimant 
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